Comprehension can be enriched by considering what a speaker could have said but did not; namely, the alternative. For example, "Betty passed some of her exams" can be interpreted as "Betty passed some but not all of her exams". This enriched interpretation is an example of a scalar implicature. We consider whether the salience and use of the alternative are independent processes in the derivation of scalar implicatures or whether use is dependent on salience. Participants completed three sentence interpretation experiments in which the sentences invited scalar implicatures. The experiments used a structural priming paradigm with alternatives and implicatures as primes. We found that (1) adults could be primed to derive scalar implicatures when the alternative was the prime (2) they did so at a rate equal to if the scalar implicature itself were the prime. In the absence of evidence that the use of the alternative can be primed independently of its salience, we conclude that salience and use are not independent processes. Instead, we suggest that when the alternative is sufficiently salient, the implicature will automatically be derived.
Introduction
People often communicate much more than they explicitly say. For example, consider the following exchanges.
A: Are John and Mary coming to the party?
B: John is. = > Mary is not. 2. I ate four doughnuts. = > I ate exactly four doughnuts. 3. Betty passed some of her exams. = > Betty passed some but not all of her exams.
In (1), B answers A's question about John coming to the party. Although B has not explicitly answered A's query about Mary's attendance, his utterance communicates that Mary is not coming. In (2), the listener can infer that the speaker ate exactly four doughnuts, even though the speaker did not explicitly say exactly four, and in (3), the listener can conclude that Betty passed some but not all of her exams, even though the speaker did not explicitly say not all.
Enrichments such as those above are commonly known as scalar implicatures. In each case the listener generated an enriched meaning based on the alternative to what the speaker said, that is, something that the speaker could have said but did not. There are many accounts of how implicatures can be derived but most assume something like the following, inspired by Grice (1989) : (i) The listener computes the basic meaning of an utterance, (ii) recognises that an alternative phrase could have been used, (iii) negates the alternative and (iv) combines this with the basic meaning. For example, in (1), Speaker A recognises that B could have said "John and Mary are coming to the party" (the alternative). Since B did not say this, and assuming that she is being cooperative, A can infer that "John and Mary are coming to the party" is not true. Thus, combining what is said, John is coming to the party, with the negation of the alternative, it is not the case that John and Mary are coming to the party, the listener arrives at the meaning that John but not Mary is coming to the party. Similar reasoning can be used to derive the enrichment seen in the other examples. In (2), since the speaker said four but not five, six, seven, etc., the listener can infer that not five, not six, not seven is the case, and conclude that the speaker means four but no more. In (3) the speaker could have said all, but since they did not, the speaker can infer not all.
Implicatures are optional: the listener chooses whether to incorporate an implicature into the sentence meaning. For example, in (3), if the preceding discourse had been about whether Betty would pass any of her exams, the listener would likely not derive the not all inference (since the not all part would be largely irrelevant). Understanding how and why certain contexts cause people to enrich the basic meaning of expressions has been a fundamental research goal in pragmatics (e.g. Chierchia, 2013; Geurts, 2010; Grice, 1989; Horn, 1972 Horn, , 1989 Levinson, 2000) and psycholinguistics (e.g. Bott, Bailey, & Grodner, 2012; Bott & Chemla, 2016; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2013; Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006 
